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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we design gross product maximization mechanisms which incentivize
users to upload high-quality contents on user-generated-content (UGC) websites.
We show that, the proportional division mechanism, which is widely used in prac-
tice, can perform arbitrarily bad in the worst case. The problem can be formulated
using a linear program with bounded and increasing variables. We then present
an O(n logn) algorithm to find the optimal mechanism, where n is the number of
players.
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1 Introduction
User-generated-content (UGC) websites [1, 2, 3] refer to those whose contents rely on users’ post.
In the last decades, we have witnessed an increasing number of UGC websites such as video-
sharing website YouTube, question-and-answers websiteQuora and online encyclopediaWikipedia
where users generate contents autonomously. On such websites, users are both consumers who
view contents and contributors who post contents. High-quality contents play an important role in
the success of these websites. Therefore a fundamental challenge faced by the UGC websites is
to incentivize users to contribute high-quality contents. In this paper, we consider the problem of
maximizing quality of all contents generated by users through a monetization reward mechanism
[4, 5].
In general, the center designs a reward function which maps a profile of users’ contributed con-
tents to a reward allocation. There are two natural models for such a reward function: a competitive
model [6, 7, 8, 9] or an independent model [10, 11]. For example, a reward function used by the
Olympic games depends on the rank of contribution among all players and thus it is a competitive
model. Ghosh and Hummel [12] analyze the equilibrium in such rank-order mechanisms, where
impressions are allocated in the decreasing order of content qualities. In particular, they also an-
alyze the proportional mechanism, where impressions are allocated in proportional to qualities.
Luo et al. [13] give an optimal solution to the all-pay contests where each agent’s type (ability to
generate good contents) is private and is drawn from a known distribution. They allow personal-
ized reward function that can be different for different agents, while we impose the restriction of
anonymity which is required by almost all these UGC sites.
This paper focuses on the reward function for the independent model where an agent’s reward
doesn’t depend on the quality other agents contribute. For example, a taxation rule used by gov-
ernment depends on how much a person earned regardless of other people’s status [14, 15]. The
merit of such an independent model is that it is easier for a user to compute the best strategy, and
thus it is widely adopted in large-scale practical markets.
As a result, we restrict the design space to a universal reward function which maps from a user’s
contribution to a non-negative real reward. Dasgupta and Nti [16] considers a similar problem but
they only focus on the case where the types of all agents are the same. In our model, we consider
the general case where agents could have different types.
The goal of the center is to design such a reward mechanism to incentivize users to generate high-
quality contents as much as possible. When a user generates a content, the user also takes a cost
that depends on his type. Given the reward function, a user can choose how much effort to put in
generating the content and will take the best action to maximize utility. We now present the center
question studied in this paper:
If the website has a fixed budget, what is the optimal reward mechanism?
Some mechanisms such as top-K allocation, proportional allocation have been proven simple to
reach Nash Equilibria among users. However, we will show that the proportional allocation can
benefit the center as little as an ǫ fraction of the optimal objective.
2
1.1 Our Techniques
We first give a characterization of the optimal reward mechanism and formalize it as a linear
program with variables x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n of the form
maximize
n∑
i=1
x∗i
subject to 0 ≤ x∗i ≤ qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
0 ≤ x∗1 ≤ x
∗
2 ≤ · · · ≤ x
∗
n,
n∑
i=1
zix
∗
i ≤ K,
(1)
where 0 < q1 ≤ · · · ≤ qn, zi > 0 and K > 0. The connection between these variables and the
mechanism will be discussed in detail in the context. Here we focus on this linear program.
Although there are various techniques of solving standard linear programmings [17], linear pro-
grammings with specific forms are also studied in the literature. Andersson and Vorobyov [18]
study a similar linear programming where each constraint has the form xi ≥ λxj + β for some
β, λ ∈ R with 0 < λ < 1, and each variable appears in the left-hand side of at least one con-
straint. Burkard et al. [19] study a specific kind of linear programming with bounded constraints
0 ≤ xi ≤ x¯i. However, their techniques do not help to solve our Problem (1).
In Section 5, we propose a greedy algorithm, which is, to our knowledge, the first efficient algo-
rithm that solves linear programmings of the form (1). This algorithm initializes x∗1 = x
∗
2 = · · · =
x∗i−1 = 0, and maintains a set S of indices that indicate which x
∗
i ’s are currently full (i.e. x
∗
i = qi).
The set S is initialized with {0, n+1} and the algorithm iteratively adds an index i to S in a greedy
principle such that iminimizes the average value of zi, zi+1, . . . , zminj>i:j∈S j−1. At the same time it
increases simultaneously x∗i , x
∗
i+1, . . . , x
∗
minj>i:j∈S j−1
by a value as large as possible, which means
either x∗i reaches the bound qi or
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i reaches the bound K. This algorithm runs in Θ(n
2)
time because one needs to maintain the average value of zi, zi+1, . . . , zminj>i:j∈S j−1 for each i, and
each time an index is added to S, it takes Θ(n) time to update these average values. Observing
that for any i, the average value of zi, zi+1, . . . , zminj>i:j∈S j−1 is only used in the iteration where i
is chosen (let us denote by avgi this average value)
1, it is straightforward to consider computing
avgi in advance instead of maintaining the average value as S grows. In Section 6, we prove that
if for each i, we compute avgi at the very beginning of the algorithm, and does not update it, the
algorithm is still correct. The improved algorithm runs in O(n logn) time. Although our problem
is motivated in the context of UGC website, our algorithm is of independent interest for solving
linear programs of the form (1).
2 Preliminaries
Let N = (1, 2, . . . , n) be the set of all agents in a UGC website. Each agent i has a private type
qi ∈ R+, which stands for the best quality of content that he can produce. Without loss of generally,
1This average value varies as S grows in each iteration, but we are only interested in its value in the iteration where
i is chosen, which is denoted by avg
i
.
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we assume 0 < q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qn. In this paper, we analyze the problem of incentivizing high-
quality contents in the full information setting where the type profile (q1, q2, . . . , qn) is known to
all agents and the website. The action of each agent i is posting a content with quality xi on the
website where xi cannot exceed her type qi. In this paper, we consider a continuous action space,
namely, xi ∈ [0, qi]. The cost for agent i to produce a content with quality xi is ci = xiC/qi, where
C is a positive constant.
Given a fixed budget B, the website aims to design a reward mechanism that maximizes the gross
product, which is defined as the overall quality of all contents on the website, i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi. The
reward mechanism specifies each agent’s reward when the budget and agents’ types are given.
Formally,
Definition 1 (Reward mechanism). A reward mechanism is a reward function f where f : R+ 7→
R+ is the mapping from the quality of a content to the reward.
Note that the reward function only takes one agent’s action as the input, which means the reward
an agent receives is only based on the quality of content he produces and independent of other
agents’ actions. This mechanism is simple and easily understood by agents, also makes agents pay
more attention to their own contents instead of the environment.
We assume that agents can get no utilities except for the reward on the website, thus the utility of
agent i is the reward she receives minus the cost of producing the content, i.e.,
ui(xi) = f(xi)−
xiC
qi
.
All agents are strategic, meaning that they will give the best responses, choosing qualities of con-
tents which maximize their utilities, to the reward function.
With strategic agents, our goal is to find an optimal reward function f that results in the maximal
gross product. The problem we describe above can be represented as the optimization problem
presented as below.
maximize
n∑
i=1
x∗i
subject to (utility definition) ui(xi) = f(xi)−
xiC
qi
(incentive constraint) ∀x ∈ [0, qi], ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui(x), i = 1, 2, . . . , n
(budget constraint)
n∑
i=1
f(x∗i ) ≤ B
(capability constraint) 0 ≤ x∗i ≤ qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
(non-negative reward) ∀x ≥ 0, f(x) ≥ 0
(2)
3 The Proportional Mechanism
In this section, we introduce the widely used mechanism, the proportional mechanism. In the
proportional mechanism, agents share the total reward in proportional to the qualities of contents
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they produce. Formally, the utility of agent i in this mechanism can be represented as
ui(xi, x−i) =
xiB∑n
j=1 xj
−
xiC
qi
.
For completeness, let ui(xi, x−i) be 0 if xi = 0 for all i.
In this mechanism, the utility of each agent depends not only on the quality of the content she
produces, but also on the qualities of the contents other agents produce. However, this mechanism
is very inefficient, in the sense that the ratio of the gross product of the website under any Nash
equilibrium to that under any optimal solution in our mechanism can be infinitely small. We state
its inefficiency on gross product in the following theorem. All the missing proofs in this paper are
deferred to the appendices.
Theorem 1. Even if there are 2 agents and the total budget B equals to the cost constant C, for
any ǫ > 0, there exists a type profile (q1, q2) of the agents such that for any pure Nash equilibrium
(xprop1 , x
prop
2 ) of the proportional mechanism and for any optimal solution (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) to Problem (2),
we have
xprop1 + x
prop
2
x∗1 + x
∗
2
≤ ǫ.
This theorem shows that our mechanism corresponding to Problem (2) beats the proportional
mechanism a lot.
4 The optimal Mechanism
The problemwe formulate in Section 2 is complicated since the optimization variable is a mapping,
which has a huge design space. In this section, we prove that the original problem can be solved in
polynomial time. We first show that there always exists an optimal solution such that x∗1 ≤ x
∗
2 ≤
· · · ≤ x∗n, which implies an agent with higher type will post a content with higher quality. Then we
characterize the optimal piecewise reward function. By taking advantages of such characterization,
we formulate a linear programming to find the optimal solution.
Lemma 1. For any feasible solution (f, x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n) to Problem (2), there exists a feasible so-
lution (f, x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n) to (2) such that x
′
1 ≤ x
′
2 ≤ · · · ≤ x
′
n and
∑n
i=1 x
′
i ≥
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i .
Lemma 1 implies that we can only focus on the ordinal strategy profile (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n) where
0 ≤ x∗i ≤ qi for each i, and x
∗
1 ≤ x
∗
2 ≤ · · · ≤ x
∗
n. However, this characterization is not enough to
make x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n feasible because there may not exist a reward function f that incentivizes the
agents. Given the ordinal strategy profile (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n), the following lemma gives a necessary
and sufficient condition of f that makes (f, x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n) be a feasible solution of Problem (2).
Lemma 2. Given x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n such that 0 ≤ x
∗
i ≤ qi for each i, and x
∗
1 ≤ x
∗
2 ≤ · · · ≤ x
∗
n, there
exists a function f such that (f, x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is a feasible solution to (2) if and only if
C
(
x∗n
qn
+
n−1∑
i=1
(
(n− i)
(
1
qi
−
1
qi+1
)
+
1
qi
)
x∗i
)
≤ B. (3)
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Moreover, if (3) is satisfied, to make (f, x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) a feasible solution, we can set
f(x) =


0, if 0 ≤ x < x∗1,
x∗1C
q1
, if x∗1 ≤ x < x
∗
2,(
x∗1
q1
−
x∗1
q2
+
x∗2
q2
)
C, if x∗2 ≤ x < x
∗
3,
· · · ,(
x∗1
q1
−
x∗1
q2
+
x∗2
q2
−
x∗2
q3
+ · · ·+
x∗n
qn
)
C, if x ≥ x∗n.
(4)
The two lemmas above induce an equivalent linear programming to solve the original problem.
Theorem 2. Problem (2) has the same optimal value as the following linear programming:
maximize
n∑
i=1
x∗i
subject to 0 ≤ x∗i ≤ qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
0 ≤ x∗1 ≤ x
∗
2 ≤ · · · ≤ x
∗
n,
C
(
x∗n
qn
+
n−1∑
i=1
(
(n− i)
(
1
qi
−
1
qi+1
)
+
1
qi
)
x∗i
)
≤ B.
(5)
Once an optimal solution (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n) is obtained, an optimal reward function can be con-
structed as (4).
For ease of representation, let zi be the coefficient of x
∗
i in the budget constraint in Problem (5),
that is, zi = (n− i)(1/qi − 1/qi+1) + 1/qi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, and zn = 1/qn, then we can see
that Problem (5) is exactly the form of Problem (1), whereK = B/C. In the rest of the paper, we
will focus on Problem (1).
5 A Greedy Algorithm
In this section, we propose a Θ(n2) greedy algorithm that solves Problem (1) (thus Problem (5) is
also solved). We first present our algorithm and then show the output of the algorithm is exactly
an optimal solution of Problem (1).
For ease of representation, let us define
sum(i, j) = zi + zi+1 + · · ·+ zj−1, avg(i, j) =
sum(i, j)
j − i
.
In Problem (5), since for any i < j ≤ n, sum(i, j) = (n − i + 1)/qi − (n − j + 1)/qj , and
sum(i, n + 1) = (n − i + 1)/qi, both the functions sum and avg can be computed in O(1) time.
In the more general Problem (1), we still assume that they can be computed in O(1) time. For the
Θ(n2) algorithm proposed in this section, this assumption is reasonable because we can compute
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sum(i, j) and avg(i, j) for each i, j in advance, which does not increase the time complexity of
the algorithm. We will give further explanation why this assumption is reasonable at the end of
Section 6.
Note there are three kinds of constraints in Problem (1), and it is their combination that makes this
problem non-trivial:
1. Without the constraints x∗i ≤ qi, it is optimal to set x
∗
1 = x
∗
2 = · · · = x
∗
i−1 = 0 and x
∗
i−1 =
x∗i−2 = · · · = x
∗
n = K/sum(i, n + 1) where i is the index that minimizes avg(i, n+ 1).
2. Without the constraint 0 ≤ x∗1 ≤ · · · ≤ x
∗
n, the following simple algorithm would output
an optimal solution: initializing x∗1 = x
∗
2 = · · · = x
∗
n = 0, and then increasing x
∗
i to qi for
each i in the order for zi’s from large to small, until
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i reaches K.
3. Without the constraint
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i ≤ K, it is optimal to set x
∗
i = qi for each i.
When all the three kinds of constraints exist, none of the methods above applies, which makes
Problem (1) hard to solve.
Our algorithm can be considered as a combination of the three methods above. In short, our
algorithm initializes x∗1 = x
∗
2 = · · · = x
∗
i−1 = 0, and maintains a set S of indices that in-
dicate which x∗i ’s are currently full (i.e., x
∗
i = qi). The set S is initialized with {0, n + 1}
and the algorithm iteratively adds an index i to S in a greedy principle such that i minimizes
the average value of zi, zi+1, . . . , zminj>i:j∈S j−1. At the same time it increases simultaneously
x∗i , x
∗
i+1, . . . , x
∗
minj>i:j∈S j−1
by a value as large as possible, which means either x∗i reaches the
bound qi or
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i reaches the bound K. This whole algorithm is formally shown as Algo-
rithm 1.
Suppose Algorithm 1 runs for k iterations in total, and Line 7 chooses i∗ to be i1, i2, . . . , ik in order.
We define Sℓ to be the set S after the ℓth iteration, i.e., Sℓ = {0, i1, . . . , iℓ, n+ 1}. In addition, we
define
leftℓ(i) = max
j∈Sℓ:j<i
j, rightℓ(i) = min
j∈Sℓ:j>i
j.
Note by these definitions, we have in the ℓth iteration, iL = leftℓ(i
∗) and iR = rightℓ(i
∗).
The notations used to analyze Algorithm 1 are summarized in Table 1.
Before we prove the correctness of this algorithm, we state Lemma 3 to show how the values of
xi, yi’s and Bˆ change in the algorithm.
Lemma 3. Immediately after the ℓth (ℓ < k) iteration, for each i, we have
xi =
{
qi, if i ∈ Sℓ,
xi−1, otherwise,
(6)
yi = avg (i, rightℓ(i)) , (7)
Bˆ = K −
n∑
i=1
zixi. (8)
These properties also hold for ℓ = k except that xik is not necessarily equal to qik .
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Table 1: Notations
Notations Meanings
n, qi, K the parameters in Problem (1)
x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n the variables in Problem (1), usually mentioned along with an optimal solution
iL, iR, d, xi, yi, Bˆ, S the variables used in the description of Algorithm 1
k the number of iterations for which Algorithm 1 runs in total
i1, i2, . . . , ik Line 7 of Algorithm 1 chooses i
∗ to be i1, i2, . . . , ik in order
Sℓ the set S immediately after the ℓth iteration
leftℓ(i) maxj∈Sℓ:j<i j
rightℓ(i) minj∈Sℓ:j>i j
Algorithm 1: An O(n2) Algorithm to Solve
Problem (1)
1 S ← {0, n+ 1};
2 for i← 1 to n do
3 yi ← avg(i, n+ 1);
4 xi ← 0;
5 Bˆ ← K;
6 while Bˆ > 0 and S 6= {0, 1, . . . , n+ 1} do
7 i∗ ← argmin
i/∈S
(yi, i); // (a, b) < (c, d)
if and only if a < c, or a = c
and b < d, so if there are
minimum values, the algorithm
will choose the one with the
smallest index
8 iL ← max
i∈S:i<i∗
i;
9 iR ← min
i∈S:i>i∗
i;
10 d← min
{
Bˆ
(iR − i∗)yi∗
, qi∗ − xi∗
}
;
11 Bˆ ← Bˆ − d(iR − i
∗)yi∗;
12 for i← i∗ to iR − 1 do
13 xi ← xi + d;
14 for i← iL + 1 to i
∗ − 1 do
15 yi ← avg(i, i
∗);
16 add i∗ to S;
17 output x1, . . . , xn as x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
n;
Algorithm 2: Improved Algorithm 1
1 S ← {0, n+ 1};
2 bn ← n + 1; // bi is used to compute
b(i)
3 yn ←
1
qn
;
4 for i← n− 1 to 1 do
5 bi ← i+ 1;
6 while bi 6= n + 1 and
avg(i, bi) ≤ avg(bi, bbi) do
7 bi ← bbi ;
8 yi ← avg(i, bi);
9 xi ← 0;
10 Bˆ ← K;
11 while Bˆ > 0 and S 6= {0, 1, . . . , n+ 1} do
12 i∗ ← argmin
i/∈S
(yi, i); // (a, b) < (c, d)
if and only if a < c, or a = c
and b < d, so if there are
minimum values, the algorithm
will choose the one with the
smallest index
13 d← min
{
Bˆ
(bi − i∗)yi∗
, qi∗ − xi∗
}
;
14 Bˆ ← Bˆ − d(bi − i
∗)yi∗;
15 for i← i∗ to bi − 1 do
16 xi ← xi + d;
17 add i∗ to S;
18 output x1, . . . , xn as x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
n;
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This lemma can be proven by observing that these equations hold initially, and the updates for
xi, yi and S in each iteration of Algorithm 1 do not invalidate them. We omit the detail of this
proof.
Lemma 4 is a supplement of Lemma 3. It shows what the values of xi’s are after the last iteration.
Lemma 4. After the last iteration, either
∑n
i=1 zixi = K, or xi = qi for each i.
Now we begin to prove the correctness of Algorithm 1. We first show that the subset
{xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xik} of the output of Algorithm 1 matches an optimal solution.
Lemma 5. Let x1, x2, . . . , xn be the variables after the last iteration. There exists an optimal
solution for Problem (1) such that x∗i1 = xi1 , x
∗
i2
= xi2 , . . ., and x
∗
ik
= xik .
With Lemma 5, it is not hard to prove the correctness of Algorithm 1. We state it as Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. The optimal solution to Problem (1) can be solved by Algorithm 1.
Proof. Consider the optimal solution in Lemma 5. Let x1, x2, . . . , xn be the variables after the
last iteration. By Lemma 5, we have x∗i = xi for all x ∈ Sk. Now let us fix some i /∈ Sk.
By the feasibility constraints in Problem (1), we have x∗i ≥ x
∗
leftk(i)
. By Lemma 5, we have
x∗leftk(i) = xleftk(i). By (6) we have xleftk(i) = xi. Hence we can conclude that for any i, no matter
whether i ∈ Sk or not, x
∗
i ≥ xi. If there exists some i such that x
∗
i > xi, then xi < qi, and by
Lemma 4,
∑n
i=1 zixi = K, so
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i >
∑n
i=1 zixi = K, which contradicts to the feasibility
constraints in Problem (1). As a result, for any i, x∗i = xi. This algorithm is an optimal algorithm.
6 A More Efficient Algorithm
Note in Algorithm 1, the variables xi’s and yi’s are updated many times by Line 13 and 15 in
each iteration, which are two main bottlenecks that make this algorithm run in Θ(n2) time. In this
section, we aim to improve this algorithm by avoiding redundant computation of xi’s and yi’s. The
improved algorithm runs in O(n logn) time.
We first solve the bottleneck for yi’s. For any i, let us denote by b(i) (the blocker for i) the final i
∗
in the last update for yi. If there is no blocker for i, i.e., yi keeps 1/qi all along, let b(i) = n+1 for
convenience. In addition, let b0(·) be the identity function, and bm(·) = b(bm−1(·)). The following
lemma shows that if we know b(i) for each i in advance, we can improve our algorithm by directly
assigning avg(i, b(i)) to yi at the beginning, no need of updating yi any more.
Lemma 6. If we modify Algorithm 1 by initializing yi to be avg(i, b(i)) (before the while loop)
and not updating them any more (deleting Line 14 to 15), then for any inputs, the modified version
has the same outputs as Algorithm 1’s.
Lemma 6 gives us insights to design more efficient algorithms. If the blockers are known in
advance, a faster algorithm gets naturally. Hence the main challenge becomes finding the blocker
for each i. We will state some properties of the blockers first in the following lemmas. Then we
will show how to design an algorithm to get such blockers by using their properties.
Lemma 7. In each iteration, iR = b(i
∗), which means all indices between i∗ (including) and b(i∗)
(excluding) do not belong to S and b(i∗) ∈ S for the set S immediately before this iteration.
Lemma 8 shows the execution order of iterations where i∗ is chosen to be i, b(i) and the indices
between them.
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0 iL i∗ iR
avg(i, b(i∗)) < avg(i, i∗)
avg(i∗, i) ≤ avg(i, b(i∗))
b(i∗)
n+ 1
Figure 1: avg Inequalites
Lemma 8. For any i, if b(i) ≤ n, then
i) the iteration where i∗ = i comes after the iteration where i∗ = b(i), and
ii) for any i < j < b(i), the iteration where i∗ = j comes after the iteration where i∗ = i.
Lemma 9 shows two inequality relations among avg’s related to iL, i
∗, iR in each iteration. Figure
1 diagrams these relations.
Lemma 9. In each iteration, for any i∗ < i < b(i∗), we have avg(i∗, i) ≤ avg(i, b(i∗)), and for
any iL < i < i
∗, we have avg(i, b(i∗)) < avg(i, i∗).
Lemma 10. In any iteration, if there exists somem and j such that i∗ = bm(j), then iL < j.
By combining Lemma 9 and 10, we can get the following corollary immediately.
Corollary 1. In any iteration, if there exists some m ≥ 1 and j such that i∗ = bm(j), then
avg(j, b(i∗)) < avg(j, i∗).
With the properties stated above, we can show the following important property of b(i), which
suggests us a way to find b(i) for each i.
Theorem 4. For any i, there exists somem such that b(i) = bm(i+1). Moreover, for any 0 ≤ t <
m, we have
avg(i, bt(i+ 1)) ≤ avg(bt(i+ 1), bt+1(i+ 1)), (9)
and if bm+1(i+ 1) exists,
avg(i, bm(i+ 1)) > avg(bm(i+ 1), bm+1(i+ 1)). (10)
Proof. We first show that b(i) = bm(i + 1) for some m. We can assume there exists j such that
i < j < b(i), otherwise b(i) = i+1 = b0(i+1). By Lemma 8, the iteration where i∗ = b(i) comes
before the iteration where i∗ = j, so in the iteration where i∗ = j, we have already b(i) ∈ S, thus
b(j) = iR ≤ b(i). By choosing j to be i+ 1, we have b(i) ≥ b(i + 1). If b(i) > b(i + 1), we then
choose j to be b(i + 1), and have b(i) ≥ b2(i + 1). By applying this process repeatedly, we will
have b(i) = bm(i+ 1) for somem finally.
Now let us fix a t such that 0 ≤ t < m. For any t < τ < m, consider the iteration where
i∗ = bτ (i + 1). By Corollary 1 we have avg(bt(i + 1), bτ+1(i + 1)) < avg(bt(i + 1), bτ (i + 1)).
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By choosing τ to be t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , m− 1 and combining these inequalities, we have avg(bt(i+
1), bm(i+1)) < avg(bt(i+1), bt+1(i+1)). Then we consider the iteration where i∗ = i. By Lemma
9 we have avg(i, bt(i+ 1)) ≤ avg(bt(i+ 1), b(i)). Combining the two inequalities above, we have
proved (9). Moreover, if bm+1(i + 1) exists, consider the iteration where i∗ = bm(i + 1) = b(i),
then (10) is implied by Corollary 1.
By Theorem 4, we can find b(i) by checking whether avg(i, bt(i+1)) ≤ avg(bt(i+1), bt+1(i+1))
for t = 0, 1, . . ., which results in Algorithm 2. Now we have solved the bottleneck for yi’s. The
bottleneck for xi’s is solved in the proof of Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 2 runs in O(n logn) time.
Proof. The only tricky parts are Line 6 to 7 and Line 15 to 16.
Now let us fix an index j. Suppose Line 6 accesses j as bi and the condition in the while loop still
holds, which means i < j < b(i). We can prove by mathematical induction that for any i′ < i,
there does not existm such that bm(i′ + 1) = j, which means j will not be accessed by Line 6 any
more. In other words, except for the last iteration in the loop corresponding to to Line 6 to 7, each
index is accessed as bi at most once by Line 6 during the whole algorithm. Hence Line 4 to 9 cost
O(n) time in total.
To efficiently update xi’s in Line 15 to 16, we can use a binary indexed tree. More precisely, we
maintain an array A of size n. InitiallyA is filled with zeros. Each time we add d to xi, xi+1 . . . , xj ,
we instead increase A[i] by d and if j < n, decrease A[j + 1] by d. Each time we access xi, we
instead return the initial value of xi plus A[1] + A[2] + · · · + A[i]. With a binary indexed tree,
both operations can be done in O(logn) time. Hence updating and accessing xi’s in the whole
algorithm cost O(n logn) time.
So the whole algorithm runs in O(n logn) time.
Recall that the analysis above is based on the fact that avg(i, j) can be computed in O(1) time for
any i < j. This is true for our UGC website problem, but what if we are facing a general problem
of the form (1), where avg(i, j) cannot be computed in O(1) time? Is Algorithm 2 still able to run
in O(n logn) time?
Note in Line 6 to 8, since bi > i, the initialization for ybi is completed, i.e., the value of avg(bi, bbi)
is already recorded in ybi , so we can replace avg(bi, bbi) with ybi . Moreover, instead of initializing
yi with avg(i, bi) in Line 8, we can first initialize yi with zi, and update it when bi is updated, so that
we can also replace avg(i, bi) in Line 6 with yi. As a result, Line 6 to 8 can be rewritten as follows.
· · ·
yi ← zi;
while bi 6= n+ 1 and yi ≤ ybi do
yi ←
(bi − i)yi + (bbi − bi) ybi
bbi − i
;
bi ← bbi ;
· · ·
Now in this new pseudocode, there is no avg any more, so Algorithm 2 is able to run inO(n logn)
time even if avg(i, j) cannot be computed in O(1) time.
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Appendices
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. If xprop1 = x
prop
2 = 0, we have for any 0 < δ ≤ q1, u1(δ, 0) ≤ u1(0, 0) = 0, i.e., δ/q1 ≥
B/C, which is impossible, so we can assume xprop1 and x
prop
2 cannot be 0 at the same time.
Without loss of generality, we assume xprop1 6= 0. Let u1(x) = u1(x, x
prop
2 ), then for any 0 < x ≤ q1,
u′1(x) = x
prop
2 B/(x+ x
prop
2 )−C/q1, so we have u
′
1(q1) = x
prop
2 B/(q1 + x
prop
2 )
2 −C/q1 ≤ 0. Since
xprop1 is an optimal value for u1(x) over (0, q1], and u
′
1(q1) ≤ 0, we must have u
′
1(x
prop
1 ) = 0, which
means
xprop2 =
(xprop1 + x
prop
2 )
2C
q1B
> 0. (11)
Then after performing a similar argument as above, we have
xprop1 =
(xprop1 + x
prop
2 )
2C
q2B
. (12)
By combining (11) and (12) we get xprop1 + x
prop
2 = Bq1q2/(C(q1 + q2)) = q1q2/(q1 + q2). So we
can set q1 = min{ǫ, 1/2} and q2 = 1− q1, then (x
prop
1 + x
prop
2 )/q2 = q1/(q1 + q2) ≤ ǫ.
By contrast, if we set the reward function f to be
f(x) =
{
0, if x < q2,
C, otherwise,
then agent 1 would not participate while agent 2 is incentivized to produce a content with quality
q2. Hence we have x
∗
1 + x
∗
2 = q2, which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Note we can arbitrarily reorder x∗i ’s for players with the same ability with keeping the
solution feasible, we can assume x∗i ≥ x
∗
j if qi = qj for each i > j without loss of generality. We
then show that with this assumption, x∗i ≥ x
∗
j for each i > j even if qi > qj , which completes the
proof.
Let us consider indices i > j with qi > qj . Suppose x
∗
j > x
∗
i . By the incentive constraint, we have
ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui(x
∗
j ) and uj(x
∗
j ) ≥ uj(x
∗
i ), or f(x
∗
i )−x
∗
iC/qi ≥ f(x
∗
j)−x
∗
jC/qi and f(x
∗
j)−x
∗
jC/qj ≥
f(x∗i )−x
∗
iC/qj . By summing up the two inequalities above, we have (x
∗
i −x
∗
j )j(1/qj−1/qi) ≥ 0,
a contradiction. Hence x∗j ≤ x
∗
i .
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose f with x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n is a feasible solution to (2). Note by the incentive constraint,
we have for any i, ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui(x
∗
i−1), that is (x
∗
0 is defined to be 0)
f(x∗i )−
x∗iC
qi
≥ f(x∗i−1)−
x∗i−1C
qi
.
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This inequality holds for any i, so we can sum up the inequalities for 1, 2, . . . , i to get
i∑
j=1
f(x∗j )−
i∑
j=1
x∗jC
qj
≥
i∑
j=1
f(x∗j−1)−
i∑
j=1
x∗j−1C
qj
,
i.e.,
f(x∗i ) ≥
(
x∗i
qi
+
i−1∑
j=1
(
1
qj
−
1
qj+1
)
x∗j
)
C. (13)
By summing up (13) from i = 1 to n, we have
n∑
i=1
f(x∗i ) ≥ C
(
x∗n
qn
+
n−1∑
i=1
(
(n− i)
(
1
qi
−
1
qi+1
)
+
1
qi
)
x∗i
)
.
Since by the budget constraint,
∑n
i=1 f(x
∗
i ) ≤ B, the inequality (3) is proven.
On the other hand, suppose (3) is satisfied, we can choose f to be a step function according to (13),
i.e.,
f(x) =


0, if 0 ≤ x < x∗1,
x∗1C
q1
, if x∗1 ≤ x < x
∗
2,(
x∗1
q1
−
x∗1
q2
+
x∗2
q2
)
C, if x∗2 ≤ x < x
∗
3,
· · · ,(
x∗1
q1
−
x∗1
q2
+
x∗2
q2
−
x∗2
q3
+ · · ·+
x∗n
qn
)
C, if x ≥ x∗n.
(14)
We can check that f with x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n is a feasible solution to (2).
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Consider the last iteration, i.e., the iteration where i∗ = ik. If d = Bˆ/((iR − i
∗)yi) in
Line 10, then Bˆ is updated to 0 in Line 11. Now suppose
∑n
i=1 zixi = K, then Bˆ 6= 0 by (8),
thus d must be qi∗ − xi∗ , therefore x
∗
i is updated to qi∗ in Line 13, hence xik = qik after this
iteration. Moreover, since Bˆ 6= 0 but the algorithm halts after this iteration, so we must have
S = {0, 1, . . . , n + 1} by the condition in Line 7. This means immediately after the (ℓ − 1)th
iteration, S = {0, 1, . . . , n + 1} − ik, and by (6), for each i 6= ik, xi = qi. Hence xi = qi for each
i.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We prove there exists an optimal solution for Problem (1) such that for any ℓ ≤ k, x∗i1 =
xi1 , x
∗
i2
= xi2 , . . ., and x
∗
iℓ
= xiℓ , by mathematical induction on ℓ.
The case where ℓ = 0 is trivial.
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Now suppose there exists an optimal solution for Problem (1) such that x∗i1 = xi1 , x
∗
i2 = xi2 , . . .,
and x∗iℓ−1 = xiℓ−1 , then we have x
∗
i1
= xi1 = qi1 , x
∗
i2
= xi2 = qi2 , . . ., and x
∗
iℓ−1
= xiℓ−1 = qiℓ−1 by
(6). We call an index i irregular if i /∈ Sℓ and x
∗
i > x
∗
i−1 (x
∗
0 is defined to be 0).
Now there are several cases.
1. If x∗iℓ = xiℓ , the proof is completed.
2. If x∗iℓ > xiℓ , then in this case, x
∗
i1
= xi1 , x
∗
i2
= xi2 , . . . , x
∗
iℓ
> xiℓ , and for any i /∈ Sℓ,
x∗i ≥ x
∗
leftℓ(i)
(by the feasibility constraints in Problem (1))
= xleftℓ(i) (by the inductive assumption)
= xi. (by (6))
So we have
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i >
∑n
i=1 zixi. Also, since xiℓ < x
∗
iℓ
≤ qiℓ , by Lemma 4 we have∑n
i=1 zixi = K, so
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i > K, which contradicts to the feasibility constraints in
Problem (1).
3. If x∗iℓ < xiℓ and there is no irregular index, then consider the point immediately after the
ℓth iteration. At this point, we have if i /∈ [iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ)),
x∗i = x
∗
leftℓ(i)
(since there is no irregular index)
= xleftℓ(i) (by the inductive assumption)
= xi, (by (6))
and otherwise,
x∗i = x
∗
iℓ
(since there is no irregular index)
< xiℓ (by the assumption of Case 3)
= xi, (by (6))
thus
∑n
i=1 zixi >
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i . Also, by (8) we have K −
∑n
i=1 zixi = Bˆ ≥ 0, so K −∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i > K −
∑n
i=1 zixi ≥ 0. As a result, we can increase x
∗
iℓ
, x∗iℓ+1, . . . , x
∗
rightℓ(iℓ)−1
a
bit with keeping
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i ≤ K and increasing
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i , which contradicts to the fact that
x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n make an optimal solution for Problem (1).
4. If x∗iℓ < xiℓ and there exists an irregular index in (iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ)), let r be the smallest such
index, and define
M = min{(x∗r − x
∗
r−1)sum(r, rightℓ(r)), (qiℓ − x
∗
iℓ
)sum(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ))}.
Consider an operation that for any r ≤ i < rightℓ(r), decreases x
∗
i byM/sum(r, rightℓ(r)),
then for any iℓ ≤ i < rightℓ(iℓ), increases x
∗
i by M/sum(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ)). This operation is
diagramed in Figure 2 and 3, and has the following properties:
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· · · iℓ iℓ + 1 · · · r r + 1 · · ·
x∗i
Figure 2: Before the Operation
· · · iℓ iℓ + 1 · · · r r + 1 · · ·
x∗i
Figure 3: After the Operation
(a) It does not decrease
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i .
Because in the ℓth iteration, the algorithm chooses iℓ instead of r in the ℓth iteration,
by (7) we have avg(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ)) = yiℓ ≤ yr = avg(r, rightℓ(r)). So this operation
increases
∑n
i=1 x
∗
i by
−
(rightℓ(r)− r)M
sum(r, rightℓ(r))
+
(rightℓ(iℓ)− iℓ)M
sum(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ))
= −
M
avg(r, rightℓ(r))
+
M
avg(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ))
≥ 0.
(b) It keeps the solution feasible.
i. The x∗i−1 ≤ x
∗
i ≤ qi constraint is still satisfied.
Note iℓ < r < rightℓ(iℓ) due to the definition of r, we have rightℓ(r) =
rightℓ(iℓ) due to the definition of r, and sum(r, rightℓ(r)) ≤ sum(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ)),
so x∗r , x
∗
r+1, . . . , x
∗
rightℓ(r)−1
are not increased, and are decreased by at most
M
sum(r, rightℓ(r))
≤
(x∗r − x
∗
r−1)sum(r, rightℓ(r))
sum(r, rightℓ(r))
= x∗r − x
∗
r−1,
which means the x∗i−1 ≤ x
∗
i ≤ qi constraint is still satisfied for
x∗r , x
∗
r+1, . . . , x
∗
rightℓ(r)−1
. Also, x∗iℓ = x
∗
iℓ+1
= · · · = x∗r−1 since iℓ, iℓ+1, . . . , r−1
are not irregular, and they are increased by at most
M
sum(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ))
≤
(qiℓ − x
∗
iℓ
)sum(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ))
sum(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ))
= qiℓ − x
∗
iℓ
,
so x∗iℓ , x
∗
iℓ+1
, . . . , x∗r−1 also satisfy this constraint.
ii. The
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i ≤ K constraint is still satisfied.
Because
∑n
i=1 zix
∗
i is increased by exactly
−
Msum(r, rightℓ(r))
sum(r, rightℓ(r))
+
Msum(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ))
sum(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ))
= 0.
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(c) It keeps x∗i1 = xi1 , x
∗
i2 = xi2 , . . ., and x
∗
iℓ−1
= xiℓ−1 because they are not updated by
this operation.
(d) It either decreases the number of irregular indices, or make x∗iℓ = xiℓ .
IfM = (x∗r−x
∗
r−1)sum(r, rightℓ(r)), then x
∗
r , x
∗
r+1, . . . , x
∗
rightℓ(r)−1
are first decreased
by exactly x∗r−x
∗
r−1, which makes r not irregular and does not make any non-irregular
index irregular. Then xiℓ , xiℓ+1, . . . , xrightℓ(iℓ)−1 are increased, which does not make
any non-irregular index irregular.
On the other hand, ifM = (qiℓ−x
∗
iℓ
)sum(iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ), then x
∗
iℓ
is increased by exactly
qiℓ − x
∗
iℓ
, so x∗iℓ = xiℓ after this operation.
So we can apply this operation again and again with keeping the solution feasible and
optimal until x∗iℓ = xiℓ or there is no irregular index in (iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ)), which falls into Case
1 or Case 3 or 5 respectively.
5. If x∗iℓ < xiℓ and all irregular indices (at least one) do not belong to (iℓ, rightℓ(iℓ)), let
r be the smallest irregular index, then we can define M and the operation in the same
way as Case 4. The properties of this operation in Case 4 still hold. Properties (a),
(b)(ii), (c) and (d) hold due to exactly the same argument. Property (b)(i) holds because
x∗r , x
∗
r+1, . . . , x
∗
right(r)−1 are decreased by at most x
∗
r − x
∗
r−1, and xiℓ = xiℓ+1 = · · · =
xrightℓ(iℓ)−1 and they are increased by at most qiℓ − x
∗
iℓ
. Hence, we can apply this operation
again and again until x∗iℓ = xiℓ or there is no irregular index any more, which falls into
Case 1 or Case 3 respectively.
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Note in each iteration, for any iL < i < i
∗, Algorithm 1 chooses i∗ instead of i, so yi ≥ yi∗ .
By (7), we have avg(i, iR) = yi ≥ yi∗ = avg(i
∗, iR), so avg(i, iR) ≤ avg(i, i
∗), or yi ≤ avg(i, i
∗),
which means each update does not decrease yi. So in each iteration, we have yi ≤ avg(i, b(i)),
and yi∗ = avg(i
∗, b(i∗)) since yi∗ will not be updated any more. Hence i
∗ = argmini∈S(yi, i) =
argmini∈S(avg(i, b(i)), i), which means the modified algorithm will choose the same i
∗ in each
iteration, and Line 7 to 13 have the same effect, so the modified algorithm would output the same
x1, x2, . . . , xn as Algorithm 1.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Note in each iteration, yi is updated if and only if iL < i < i
∗. Also, if i /∈ S at the
beginning of this iteration, minj∈S:j≥i j is updated in this iteration if and only if iL < i < i
∗.
Furthermore, i∗ is exactly the new minj∈S:j>i j. Hence, before i is added to S, minj∈S:j>i j is
updated if and only if yi is updated in the same iteration, and since yi will not be updated any more
after i is added to S, b(i) records the last updatedminj∈S:j>i j before i is added to S, which means
b(i∗) = iR in each iteration.
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Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. Consider the iteration where i∗ = i. By Lemma 7, b(i) is already in S while j is not for the
set S immediately before this iteration. Note an index is added to S exactly during the iteration
where i∗ is chosen to be this index, so the iteration where i∗ = b(i) comes before the iteration
where i∗ = i, which comes before the iteration where i∗ = j.
Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. For any i∗ < i < iR, we have avg(i
∗, b(i∗)) = yi∗ ≤ yi = avg(i, b(i
∗)), so avg(i∗, i) ≤
avg(i, b(i∗)). For any iL < i < i
∗, we have avg(i∗, b(i∗)) = yi∗ < yi = avg(i, b(i
∗)) (note if
yi∗ < yi in this case, the index i would be chosen instead of i
∗ by Line 7 of Algorithm 1, so we use
< instead of ≤ here), so avg(i, b(i∗)) < avg(i, i∗).
Proof of Lemma 10
Proof. By Lemma 8, bm(j), bm−1(j), · · · , b0(j) = j are added to S in order. For any j ≤ k < i,
suppose bt(j) ≤ k < bt+1(j). Consider the iteration where i∗ = bt(j). By Lemma 7, k does not
belong to S at the beginning of the iteration where i∗ = bt(j), so k does not belong to S at the
beginning of the iteration where i∗ = bm(j), since it is an earlier iteration. Note this holds for all
j ≤ k < i, so iL < j in the iteration where i
∗ = bm(j).
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